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GENERAL LEE 
AT GETTYSBURG 



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A PAPER READ BEFORE THE MILITARY 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHU 
SETTS, ON THE FOURTH OF APRIL, 1905 



BY JAMES POWER SMITH 

Captain and A. D. C. to Gen, Ewell 



-e^^f-31^ 



UBRARY OF CONGRESS 



" [SHED BY 

tx. c. i^t^ti i^Aivir, iNO. i, CONFEDERATE VETERANS 
Richmond, Va. 




Book .U^bC? 

IMiKSI'NTIOI) liY 



GENERAL LEE 
AT GETTYSBURG 



A PAPER READ BEFORE THE MILITARY 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHU 
SETTS, ON THE FOURTH OF APRIL, 1905 



BY JAMES POWER SMITH 

Captain and A. D. C. to Gen. Ewell 



PUBLISHED BV 

R. E. LEE CAMP, No. 1, CONFEDERATE VETERANS 
Richmond, Va. 



E4q 



WM. ELLIS JONES, 

PRINTER, 
RICHMOND, VA. 



lA.^ 



LAA^w'VV1JV^. crtjO'Vv 



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General Lee at Gettysburg. 

Mr. ChairDian mid Gentlemen of the 

Militarj/ Historical Society of Massachusetts : 

Last year I had the ph'asnre to read before this Society a paper 
on Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. As you have done me 
the honor to ask nie to return to Boston and to this platform, I. 
have thought to read to you a companion paper on General Lee at 
Gettysburg. I am aware that this is an ambitious theme, because 
of the very critical hour in American history which it brings 
before us, and because so much has been written apparently from 
every possible standpoint. Yet it has seemed to me that I might 
make my own contribution to the literature of the subject, or, at 
least, afford you an evening's entertainment. 

You will not be surprised that the story I am to tell is from the 
Confederate side, and may be the more interesting that it is less 
familiar. 

After Chancellorsville, the Army of the Potomac, under General 
Hooker, was again gathering itself together. It showed no desire 
to renew the attack, and on the Stafford heights it could not be 
assaulted. In his tent on the Old Mine Road, near Hamilton's 
crossing. General Lee promptly addressed himself to his maps and 
the planning of a forward movement. The financial condition of 
the Confederacy and the scarcity of supplies made time very 
precious. The Commissary General at Richmond said : "If General 
Lee wants rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania." Such an 
aggressive movement would compel the Federal army to retire from 
the unassailable north bank of the Rappahannock, would remove 
the campaign from Northern Virginia, and give the country oppor- 
tunity for recuperation. For a time, at least, the Confederate 
forces would find supply in the abundance of the rich fields and 
barns of Pennsylvania. If a successful battle could be fought on 
Northern soil, it might result in some change of sentiment in the 
North, and a cry for peace; and it might bring recognition by 
foreign powers, and a close of the war. All things pointed to the 
invasion, conditions compelled it; and General Lee, knowing the 



odds which were against him and the perils of the movement, had 
the audacity to undertake it. 

The reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia brought 
General Longstreet with two divisions. Hood's and Pickett's, from 
the Southside of Virginia. With Longstreet in command of the 
First Corps, General Ewell returning from long sick leave was put 
in command of the Second Corps, succeeding General Jackson ; 
and General A. P. Hill in command of the Third, newly organized. 
All were men of high class, graduates of the Military Academy at 
West Point, soldiers of experience and officers of renown. Organi- 
zation and preparation were speedily made. Thirty days after 
Chancellorsville. May 31, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia 
was again an organized force of 54,356 infantry, 9,536 cavalry and 
4,460 artillery, a total of 68,352 officers and men, with over two 
hundred field guns. It was a compact, mobile army, well officered, 
somewhat equipped with arms and stores imported and captured, 
and in splendid morale. On that day. May 31, General Lee writes, 
"] pray that our merciful Father in Heaven may protect and direct 
us. In that case I fear no odds and no numbers." 

THE MOVEMEXT BEGUN". 

On June 'Snd, EwelTs corps began the advance and moved by 
Germanna to Culpe]jer C. H., and two days later Longstreet's corps 
followed, General Lee with it, while General A. P. Hill was left on 
the lines at Fredericksburg to watch Hooker and to follow. With 
less than 20,000 troops. Hill was now between Hooker and Rich- 
mond, sixty miles away. The Washington authorities would not 
consent to Hooker's advance. "Lee's army, not Richmond, is your 
true objective point,"' Mr. Lincoln said. In one of his picturesque 
dispatches to Hooker, he said : "I would not take any risk of 
being entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over the 
fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair 
chance to gore one M'ay or kick the other."' 

On June 9th, the Federal cavalry, making a reconnoisance in 
force, attacked Stuart and his cavalry in Culpeper and fought the 
memorable cavalry engagement of Brandy Station. On the 10th, 
General Ewell passed through the Blue Ridge and crossed the 
Shenandoah at Front Roval. sending Imboden's cavalry otf to the 



Avest at Eomney. On the 13th. General Ewell attacked the Federal 
force at Winchester under Milro}', capturing 4,000 men and 38 guns 
with a large amount of ordnance and other stores; on the same day 
General Hooker ordered a concentration of his army at Manassas, 
an old field, already having its "twice told tale," with his own 
headquarters at Dumfries, on the Potomac. Mr. Lincoln humor- 
ously wired Hooker, "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, 
and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and 
Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could 
you not break him ?"■ 

As Lee went north, Hooker moved on a parallel line between 
Lee and Washington. Ewell had gone west of the Blue Eidge, by 
Winchester, ^Martinsburg and Williamsport, into Maryland; Long- 
street moved on the east side of the ridge with Stuart on his front 
and right iiank ; and Hill passed behind Longstreet into the Valley, 
and northward following Ewell, and then was followed by Long- 
street's corps. General Lee instructed General Stuart to keep on 
General Longstreet"s right, or at his discretion to move on the rear 
of Hooker to and across the Potomac, and as soon as possible come 
in touch with the right of EwelPs advance. Stuart passed the rear 
of Hooker's army and crossed the Potomac at Seneca, about thirteen 
miles west of Washington. General Ewell with rapid movement 
passed through Chambersburg and on June 27, reached Carlisle, 
threatening Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. General 
Lee had written, "If Harrisburg comes in your way, capture it;'' 
while General Early with his division from Ewell's corps turned 
east and went by Gettsburg to York,' to cut the railroad from Balti- 
more to Harrisburg, and seize the important bridge over the 
Susquehannah at Wrightsville. Certainly there was vigor in the 
•movement, and a great audacity. The invasion spread itself over 
an extended territory, with Jenkins and a cavalry brigade going- 
west to McConnellsburg, at its own pleasure, and Early on the Sus- 
cpiehannah to the east with Ewell scouting before Harrisburg. 
It was Lee's purpose to collect horses, beef cattle and 
supplies; while the Army of the Potomac was drawn 
away from Washington. The day Ewell reached Carlisle, 
Longstreet and Hjill reached Chambersburg, with army 
headquarters in the outskirts of the town. General Stuart 
was performing with his usiuil dash and o:aietv, not ou the west 



6 

and nortli of Hooker, but iisiiio- tl*e discretion given liim, on the 
east, between Hooker and Washington. He captured wagon trains, 
the nearest being but four miles from tlie capitol at Washington, 
burning man}^ and carrying two hundred away, greatly retarding 
his progress. He burned bridges, and cut wires and received and 
sent conflicting messages to his great delight. He fought Kil- 
patrick at Hanover, he delayed two corps in their advance, and 
after his three brigades he drew two cavalry divisions, and reached 
Dover in Pennsylvania, July 1st, with horses and men in an ex- 
hausted condition, but with the utmost satisfaction. 

At Chambersburg, General Lee issued an address to his army 
in which commending their spirit and fortitude, and forbidding 
injury to private property, and reminding them that civilization 
and Christianity forbade retaliation against their foes; he said: 
"H must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, 
and thf^^t Ave cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have 
suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhor- 
rence has been excited ])y the atrocities of our enemies, and offend- 
ing against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without wliose favor 
and support our efforts must all prove in vain." 

At C^hambersburg, on the 28th, General Lee learned from a 
calvary scout that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and moving 
northwest was approaching the South Mountains in Pennsylvania. 
As Hooker was without his cavalry at Chancellorsville, so General 
Lee in Pennsylvania was greatly embarrassed by the absence of his 
main cavalry force. Stuart was not there, as Lee had designed, 
to cover his own movements, and keep liim informed of the move- 
ments of all parts of Hooker's forces. 

A PERSONAL INCIDENT. 

A personal incident finds its place at this point. After the death 
of Jackson and his burial at Lexington, Va.. by the wish of the 
staff, I was the escort of Mrs. Jackson and her babe of seven months, 
to her father's home in lower Xorth Carolina. Peturning to Kich- 
mond. 1 leai'ncd of Lee's aiUance into Pennsylvania, and received 
ap])ointment to the staff of General Kwell, Jackson's successor in 
command of the Second Corps. By rail I went to Staunton, and 
there I found mv niounf and rode to Winchester. Crossino' the 



I*otoinac at Williamsport, I was among the last of the invaders to 
reach Pennsylvania soil. It was not so much the courage of a sol- 
dier as the thoughtlessness of youth which led aiie to ride on alone, 
in the uniform of a Confederate captain, with side arms rather 
ornamental than useful. About sunset I reached the town of Green- 
castle, in Pennsylvania, and rode slowly through the long street. 
About the corners were groups of farmers, with their horses at the 
store racks. I had gone half through the town before the thought 
came that these men, well mounted, could so easily capture my 
small force. But riding slowly through the middle of the way, I 
had the presumption to bow to the young farmers and to lift my 
cap to the astonished ladies, until I had reached the northern end, 
when I put spurs to my steed, and for a mile or two let the si>ace 
grow rapidly behind me. Througli the night I rode alone to Cham- 
bersburg, entering Confederate lines with some difficulty and a large 
assumption of authority, before the day broke on the morning of the 
20th of June. From the town, turning east, about a mile away I 
found the camp of army headquarters, and as I rode into a grove, 
General Lee was pulling on his guantlets, and preparing to mount 
Traveller, brought to him by an orderly. Beckoning me to him, the 
General received me in his grave and kindly way. He asked me 
where I came from, expressed his great loss by the death of General 
Jackson, and spoke with affectionate sympathy of Mrs. Jackson. 
Quite promptly he asked whether I had any knowledge of Gen- 
eral Stuart. I told him that I had forded the Potomac the evening 
before with two cavalrymen, whom I left at Williamsport, who said 
they had left General Stuart the day before in Prince William count}^, 
Ya., with dispatches for cavalry detachments, and orders to join 
the cavalry wagon trains in Pennsylvania. The General was evi- 
dently surprised and disturbed. He asked me to repeat my state- 
ment. When I turned away and joined the staff. Colonel Walter 
Taylor, his Adjutant-General, asked me aside the same question 
about General Stuart's whereabouts, and I told him what. I had said 
to General Lee. I asked Colonel Taylor why General Lee was con- 
cerned about General Stuart, and whether they were not informed 
about his movements, and he replied that General Lee expected 
General Stuart to report before that time in Pennsylvania, and 
that he was much disturbed by his absence, having no means of 
information about the movements of the enemv's forces. 



EASTWARD FROM CHAMBERSBURG. 

General Lee was now moving eastward for the concentration of 
of his army at Cashtown. Ewell that morning left Carlisle, and 
Hill left Chambersburg, Longstreet following the next day, leaving 
Pickett's division at Chambersburg as a rear guard. Cashtown 
is a village on the eastern side of the low mountain range, which 
runs north and south. Eight miles east is the town of Gettysburg, 
a topographical center, with roads from west and northwest meet- 
ing roads from the south and east. 

■ GETTYSBURG. 

It was a small town of about three thousand people, in middle 
Pennsylvania, but ten or twelve miles north of the Maryland line. 
It was in the middle of a fertile and picturesque country. To the 
west sloping over the rising ridges of well cultivated farms, and 
to the east, a broken land of rocky ridges and small cone-shaped 
mountains of rudely broken stone. On the western slopes are the 
College and the Theological Seminary, which give character some- 
what to the town. Quiet and retired, no one in Gettysburg dreamed 
of any coming battle, nor of the pathetic and undying fame that 
would come to the peaceful place. Neither General Lee nor General 
Meade ever thought of making it a battle field, nor that its village 
cemetery would be the center of a greater city of the dead, and the 
burying place of the hopes of a new Confederacy of the States of 
the South. 

GENERAL LEE ON THE FIELD. 

On July 1st, General Lee and stafE rode east from Cashtown and 
about three miles from Gettysburg, coming into the open country, 
he came in sight and hearing of the first day's battle. Turning 
into a grass field on his left he sat on his well-bred iron gray, 
Traveller, and looked across the fields eastward, through the smoke 
rising in puffs and long rolls. He held his glasses in his hand and 
looked down the long slope by the Seminary, over the town to the 
rugged heights beyond. A rod or two away, I sat in my saddle 
and caught the picture which has not faded from my memory, and 
gro^\^ more distinct as the years go by. He was fifty-six years old, 
with a supurb physique, five feet and eleven and one-half inchas 



9 

in height, about one hundred and seventy-five pounds in weight, 
and in perfect health. His son, Captain Lee, writes, '"'I 
never rememher liis heing ill'' He Avas a gentleman by blood 
and breeding, so truly that he was unmindful of it. He was 
plain and neat in his uniform of gray, so careful of his dress 
that there was nothing to attract attention. He wore a hat of grey 
felt, with medium brim and his boots fitted neatly, coming to his 
knee with a border of fair leather an inch wide. He was himself 
a soldier and lived as a soldier in a tent, and on the plainest fare. 
He neither knew tobacco nor cared for wine. He had the quiet 
bearing of a powerful yet harmonious nature. An unruffled calm 
upon his countenance betokened the concentration and control of 
the whole being within. He was a kingly man whom all men who 
came into his presence expected to obey. His son, recalling all his 
life with his father, says: "I alvrays knew it was impossible to dis- 
obey my father.'' With his natural dignity and reserve he was by 
no means inaccessible. He had a fine knowledge of men, and con- 
versed with his generals, and younger men, that he might know 
them better. He had a shrewd perception of the enemy's purpose. 
He had the general's courage to do great and perilous things. He 
was strong in the formation of his lines, and imperious in pressing 
them to battle to the utmost of victory. He was amiable and con- 
siderate of his generals; with an unwillingness to wound their feel- 
ings tliat did honor to his gentleness, if it did not weaken his moral 
])ower over them. To one of his sons, he once wrote, in one of 
those model letters of a father: "Duty is the sublimest word in 
the language. You cannot do more : you should never wish to do 
less." 

THE CORPS COMMANDERS. 

About General Lee were three corps commanders. Lieutenant- 
General James Longstreet, forty-three years of age, was born in 
South Carolina, long a resident of Alabama, and after the war re- 
sided in Georgia. He graduated at West Point in 1842. He was an 
officer of infantry in the Ignited States army, and commanded 
the companies which stormed the gates of Monterey, with Lieuten- 
ant George Meade, against whom he fought at Gettysburg, as en- 
gineer officer. He was calm, self possessed, unobtrusive, though 
determined, and a hard fighter of troops when he got them into 



10 

position. At Gettysburg he was unwilling and recalcitrant to say 
the least, and many think he was seriously disobedient to the wishes 
of his commander. But there, as before and after, he fought witli 
a vigor and determination that made him ah\^ays a lion in the way. 

Lieutenant-General Richard Stoddard Ewell, forty-six years old at 
Gettysburg, was a native of Prince William counts, Virginia. Ho 
graduated at West Point in 1845. He became a captain of cavalry 
and served his country in the West with galantry and distinction. 
As Fitz Lee says : "He was a brave officer and a most lovable old 
man." Commanding a brigade of infantry at the First Manassas, 
he became a trusted division commander under Jackson. At the 
Second Battle of Manassas he lost a leg, and lay invalided for some 
time in Richmond, until after Chancellorsville he was made a Lieu- 
tenant General and returned to the field to command the Second 
Corps. He was much disabled by the loss of his leg, was dyspeptic, 
and to his staff: both affectionate and irritable. With loyalty un- 
questioned, and supreme confidence in his commander, at Gettys- 
burg he lacked initiative, and at a critical moment waited for 
orders. 

Lieutenant-General Ambrose P. Hill, commanding the Third 
Corps, was thirty-nine years of age. He was a native of Culpeper, 
Va., and graduated in 1847, with Burnside. He was small and neat 
in form, and soldierly in bearing, a fine division commander. Under 
forty, he still had enough of initiative to act for himself at Gettys- 
burg, and to bring on the first day's action, contrary to General 
Lee's wishes, and with serious consequences. 

Lieutenant-General J. E. B. Stuart was but thirty 3^ears of age 
at Gettysburg. He was a native of Patrick county, Virginia, and 
graduated at West Point in 1854. He was an officer of the First 
Cavalry, with General Sumner as Colonel, and Joseph E. Johnston 
as Lieutenant-Colonel. He was an aid of Colonel R. E. Lee at 
Harper's Ferry in the John Brown rebellion. A superb horseman, 
he was an officer of energy, vigilance and personal courage, and 
irrepressible gaiety of spirits, with entire freedom from every form 
of dissipation. As a superior officer, the only criticism ever madt? 
was that he preferred a himdred times to lead a charge himself, 
rather than send another to do it. 



11 



THE FIRST DAY. 



On June 30th, General A. P. Hill being at Cashtown, Petti- 
grew's Brigade, of Hetli's Division, was permitted to go forward 
to levy from the storas of Gettysburg shoes for some of his bare- 
footed men, but he found Bu ford's cavalry about the town, and re- 
tired without the shoes. On that day, the 30th, General Lee was 
with Longstreet's camp, at Greenwood, just west of the mountain 
at Cashto^vll. Ewell with two divisions was a short distance north, 
coming east from Carlisle, and Early was retiring from York 
toward Cashtown ; Stuart, of Avhose whereabouts General Lee ImeAV 
nothing was fighting Kil pa trick at Hanover. 

Early on July 1st, Avhile General Lee rode with Longstreet to 
Cashtown, General A. P. Hill sent two divisions, Heth and Pender, 
down towards Gettysburg, as he says, "to discover what was in my 
front," or as Heth says, "to get those shoes," a premature movement 
contrary to the spirit at least of Lee's instructions. It made the 
great battle, not one of defense on the eastward slopes at Cashtown, 
but of offence at Gettysburg. Heth's advancing skirmish line found 
Buford's cavalry pickets at Willoughby's run, on the west side of 
McPherson's ridge, and forced them back with a vigor which was, 
to say the least, unfortunate for the Confederates. The sound of 
battle went west to call Ewell' forward along the road from Carlisle 
and brought General Lee to the front from Cashtown. 

General E. H. Anderson, with a division of Hill's Corps, says, 
that, at Cashtown, General Lee, listening to the guns toward 
Gettysburg, said, "I cannot think what has become of Stuart. I 
ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met 
with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, 
I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may 
be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is 
the whole Federal army we must fight a battle here; if we do not 
gain a victor)^ these defiles and gorges through which we are passing 
this morning will shelter us from disaster." 

Contrary to Lee's warning. Hill was giving battle against the 
advanced corps of the Army of the Potomac. At 10 A. M., Eey- 
nolds found the First Corps of the Federal army on Seminary ridge, 
a mile west of Gettysburg. Advancing with a division to the sup- 



12 

])ort of Buford, Eevnnlds drovo Arclier's l^rigade back over Wil- 
loiTghby's run, capturing General Archer, and falling himself slain 
on the field. At noon, HilFs divisions, Heth and Pender, held the 
First Corps at bay, and the Eleventh Corps arrived under General 
Howard, who took command of the Federal lines. Leaving one 
division with batteries on the Cemetery hill, Howard led two divi- 
sions to the front on Seminary ridge. At 2 :30 P. M., Ewell came 
down the Heidlersburg road, and Rodes' fine division swept down 
against Howard's right flank. 

At 3 :30 Early came into the battle from the York road, attack- 
ing the right and rear of Howard's line. At 4 P. M., Ewell's divi- 
sions drove the Eleventh Corps through the town, and Hill ad- 
vancing, drove the First corps, completely routed. At 4:30 P. M., 
Howard's whole command was broken, and retired to find refuge 
with the reserve division on Cemetery Hill. They left 5,000 prison- 
ers behind, with three guns, and a field with many dead and 
wounded. Nearly fifty thousand were engaged, almosf equally 
divided on the two sides, though the Confederates when all got into 
battle, were somewhat stronger. 

At first there was no thought of delay : General Leo sent Colonel 
Walter Taylor to order Ewell, "Press those people and secure the 
hill if possible," and Early's and Rodes' men went out of the town 
and on to the slopes of Cemetery Hill, undaunted and in high 
spirits. But just then. General William Smith, one of Early'^ 
brigadiers, guarding the left flank on the York road, sent word 
that a Federal force was moving on his front, and Early sent Gen- 
eral Gordon and his brigade to support General Smith. But it was 
a false alarm, and a serious loss of time. Edward Johnston's divi- 
sion of Ewell's corps was not up. Anderson's division of A. P. 
Hill's corps was yet in the rear, caught in a tangle of wagon trains. 
The four Confederate divisions on the field had fought a battle 
ugainst a force of unkno\\n numbers, and had left many officers 
and men on the field. 

A])out 5 P. M., I rode Avith Gen(>ral Ewell and staff into the 
town square of Gettysburg. The square was filled with Confederate 
.soldiers, and with them were mingled many prisoners, while scarcely 
;,! citizen was to be seen. As our corps commander sat in his saddle 
binder the shade of a tree, a young officer brought from a cellar a 
bottle of wine, which the General pleasantly declined, while he 



13 

cliatted amiabl_v with hi? men, and the Federal prisoners gathered 
about him. It was a moment of most critical importance, more 
evidently critical to ns now, than it would seem to any one then. 
But even then, some of us who had served on Jackson's staff, sat in 
a group in our saddles, and one said sadly, "Jackson is not here."' 
Our corps commander. General EavcII, as true a Confederate soldier 
as ever went into battle, was simply waiting for orders, when every 
moment of the time could not be balanced with gold. General Early 
and General Rodes came with great earnestness and animation to 
tell of their advanced position. They desired General Lee to be 
informed that they could go forward and take Cemetery hill if 
they were supported on their right ; that to the south of the Ceme- 
tery there was in sight a position commanding it which should be 
taken at once ; and I was sent by General Ewell to deliver the mes- 
sage to the commanding general. I found General Lee quite well 
to the right, in an open field, with General Longstreet, dismounted, 
and with glasses inspecting the position to the south of Cemetery 
hill. When I delivered my msssage. General Lee gave me hi* 
glasses and said that the elevated position in front was he supposed 
the commanding position of which Early and Rodes spoke, that 
some of "those people" were there (a few mounted men, apparently 
reconnoitering), that he had no force on the field with which to 
take that position; and turning to Longstreet asked where his 
troops were, and expressed the wish that they might be brought 
immediately to the front. General Longstreet replied that his 
front division, McLaws, was about six miles away, and then was 
indefinite and noncommittal. General Lee directed me to say to 
General Ewell that 'iie regretted that his people were not up to 
support him on the right, but he wished him to take the Cemetery 
hill if it were possible ; and that he would ride over and see him very 
soon."" Whatever the opportunity was, it was lost. Early and 
Rodes were ready for the assault ; A. P. Hill felt the losses in his 
command and waited for his third division, Anderson's, and Gen- 
eral Ewell, waiting for his third division, Johnston's, and diverted 
by the false alarm on his left, lacked initiative and looked for in- 
structions from his commander. 

General Hancock, of date, January IT, 1878, writes, "In my 
opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General 
Howard on the afternoon of the first day of July, at Gettysburg, 



14 

they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill. After 
I had arrived upon the field, assumed the command, and made my 
disposition for defending that point, I do not think the Confeder- 
ate force then present could have carried it." 

Colonel John E. Bachelder, the historian of Gettysburg, said, 
''there is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery 
hill made within an hour, would have been successful. At the end 
of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, 
were covered by stone walls, and under the command and magnetic 
influence of General Hancock, who in the meantime had reached 
the field, they would, in my opinion, have held the position against 
any attack from the troops then up."' Col. Batchelder states in 
support of his opinion that there Avas but one brigade that had not 
been engaged. Smith's, of Steinwher's division, with one battery 
in reserve on Cemetery hill. "The best chance for a successful 
attack was within the first hour and unquestionably the great mis- 
take of the battle was the failure to follow the Union forces through 
the town, and attack them before they could reform on Cemetery 
hill." It was no fault of Early and Eodes and their divisions, that 
the Cemetery hill was not 'taken. Instead of sending Gordon's 
brigade away. Smith's brigade could have been ordered from the 
flank; and Ewell without Avaiting for the support desired upon 
his right from A. P. Hill, could have easily taken the hill and held 
it that night. It would have saved the day, and thrown the inevi- 
table battle back on another line, probably Pipe Clay Creek, with a 
field more hopeful for General Lee. 

As the sun went down, Edward Johnson arrived on the northwest 
of the field. General Lee came over and conferred with Generals 
Ewell, Early and Eodes, outside of the town, on the Carlisle road. 
All had abandoned attack for that evening. Federal troops had 
arrived with Hancock in command, and Slocum was placed in line 
across Gulp's hill and the Cemetery hill. General Lee spoke' of an 
advance by General Ewell by daylight next morning. Early and 
Eodes again suggested advance from the ground to their right, the 
more gradual slope att'ording opjiortunity for success against the 
Cemetery hill. General Lee asked as to the possible movement of 
the corps to his right, that the line might not be so long. But 
Ewell thought lie could take Gulp's hill on his left, and threaten 
the enemv's right. "Well," said General Lee. "If I attack from my 



15 

rioht, Longstreet will have to make the attack." Then with bowed 
head he added, "Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in 
position, but he is so slow." It was concluded that the advance 
should be made from the right. General Lee rode away and joined 
General Longstreet near the Seminary, and Longstreet urged that 
he should move to his right and place his force between Meade and 
Washington. The interview ended with a distinct statement made 
by General Lee in the hearing of his staff, that he expected General 
Longstreet to attack from the right, "as early as practicable." 

Whatever was to be the result, the battle was now joined. There 
was no retreat without an engagement. Instead of the defensive, 
as he had planned. General Lee was compelled to take the offensive,, 
and himself endeavor to force the enemy away. It was not by the 
choice of Lee nor by the foresight of Meade that the Federal army 
found itself placed on lines of magnificent defence. Just east 
of the little town, across a narrow valley, there lay on the ground 
a great "fish-hook," as Swinton first and aptly called it, a fish- 
hook of rocky ridge and rugged hills. The lower convex curve of 
the hook was the Cemetery hill opposite the town. To the north- 
east the ridge curved back to the barb of the hook, the rocky sides 
of Gulp's hill,. and to the south and east the long shank lay across 
the country for several miles to find its head in the double Eound 
Top. Two main roads from the east came within the hook on their 
wav to Gettysburg, the Baltimore and the Tarrytown roads, and 
along them Meade's rapidly arriving corps found ways prepared. 
They occupied at once the concave curved lines; and were near, 
each to the other, for support in any time of need. Meade on the 
defense had both the natural position and the inner lines, while 
Lee on the offensive had the open field and steep and rugged slopes, 
and the longer outside lines. Lee was compelled to make a larger 
fish-hook, and extend a thin line from the left, before Gulp's hill, 
b}- the town and away off to the head of the hook at Round Top. 

THE SECOXD DAY. 

There can be no question that General Lee intended to attack 
very early in the morning of the second day, July 2nd. He said so 
to Ewell and his generals the night before on the Carlisle road. 
He said so to Longstreet a little while later, near the Cemetery 
Hill. General Pendleton, his Chief of Artillery, an Episcopal 



16 

clergyman, says that General Lee tt)ld him that night that he 
"had ordered General Longstreet to attack on the flank at sunrise 
next morning." General Long, of General Lee's staff, writes that 
in his opinion "orders were issued for the movement to begin on 
the enemy's left as early as practicable." 

Longstreet "s leading brigade, Kershaw's, was in bivouac only two 
miles from Gettysburg. McLaws, about six miles back, was ordered 
to move at 4 A. M., and, singularly, this order was changed during 
the night to read "early in the morning." General Lee was him- 
self in the saddle before the day dawned. He looked eagerly for 
the arrival of Anderson of Hill's corps, and for McLaws and Hood, 
of Longstreet's corps. But it was seven o'clock before Anderson 
began to move; it was 9 o'clock before Hill's divisions were 
formed along Seminary ridge, and "Longstreet's men consumed 
more than three hours of sunlight in making a journey of from 
two to four miles." (Dr. H. A. White, p. 201.) 

It was Lee's purpose to turn the enemy's left flank with Long- 
street's command, while the other corps were to make demonstra- 
tions to their front, to prevent the removal of troops to the front of 
Longstreet, and make real and vigorous advance if Longstreet Avas 
at all successful. But, as Fitzhugh Lee says (p. 277), "His chari'^t 
of war had hardly started before he found his corps team were not 
pulling together; the wheel horse selected to start it was balky and 
stubborn, and after stretching his traces, -did not draw his share of 
the load with rapidity enough to be effective." At sunrise, General 
Lee sent a messenger to General Ewell, on the left, to ask whether 
he could not attack from his flank; but Ewell at daylight found 
Gulp's hill already occupied, and axes and spades were making a 
fort of that barb of the flsh-hook. 

At sunrise that morning Meade's divisions were widely scattered. 
Less than ten thousand of his First and Eleventh corps were on the 
Cemetery hill. Right and left, were the 8,600 of Slocum's corps. 
Near at hand was the Third corps of 8,000. At any time before 
7 o'clock Lee would have found less than 27,000 men to contest 
his way. But at 7 A. M., came the Second corps, and at 8 A. M,, 
the Fifth was on the ground. At 9 A. M. came part of the Third, 
and at half-past 10 the artillery reserve was on the Seminary ridge. 

General Lee, in the presence of General Longstreet directed 
McLaws to place two divisions in position away to the right, near 



17 

the peach orchard, and perpendicuLar to the Emmettsburg road, 
and to get there without the observation of the enemy. He wished 
him to envelop the Federal left on the Emmettsburg road and 
drive him in. He told General A. P. Hill that General Long- 
street's line would be on his south, and nearly at right angles 
to his own line, and directed Hill to move into battle with 
Longstreet's left. After giving orders in person to Longstreet and 
Hill, General Lee rode into Gettysburg, to examine Ewell's position 
on the left. Since 2 o'clock in the morning, Early was in line at 
the foot of the slope, ready to scale the Cemetery hill, and eager 
for the order to advance. In Gettysburg, General Lee waited 
anxiously for the sound of Longstreet's guns. He was exceedingly 
impatient. "What can detain Longstreet," he said, "He ought to 
be in position now.*' It was 1 o'clock before General Longstreet 
set his column in motion, losing three golden hours of sun- 
light after he was ordered to move. Two more hours Avere taken in 
bringing the troops to the position assigned, taking a long circuitous 
route. It was 4 in the afternoon, when the force was in line of 
battle before Little Eound Top. General Sickles had placed his 
command on the Emmettsburg road, at the peach orchard, by 
misunderstanding of instructions, quite in advance of the natural 
position on the ridge and at the Round Top. And Longstreet 
placed McLaws directly in front of him with Hood on the right, 
in a line perpendicular. 

General Meade had instructed General Butterfield, his chief of 
staff, early in the morning to prepare an order for retreat, and 
later there was a conference of corps commanders to consider this 
order, but at 4 P. M., Longstreet's attack broke up this confer- 
ence. General Law, on the right of Hood, urged the occupa- 
tion of Round Top, his couriers finding the Federal flank unpro- 
tected. Three times it was urged. But Longstreet's reply was 
"General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road." 
After 4, Hood began the advance, his right going into Sickles' 
left, about the Little Round Top and the Devil's Den. Then 
ilcLaws' division went in at the peach orchard with a terrific on- 
slaught. Three Federal divisions came to Sickle's help, with 13,- 
000 men, but all were forced back. A. P. Hill's line now moved 
forward, and soon sent the right of Sickle's corps in retreat to the 
Seminarv ridge. And T o'clock in the evening found the com- 



18 

plete defeat of Meade's left wing. Wright's Georgians went steadily 
lip the slope, leaped the stone fences, and occupied the crest of the 
ridge, a short distance south of the Cemetery. But Hill's advance 
was in detail and was not supported. Wright could not stand alone, 
and with the converging forces pressing in on him, he was driven 
back, and the tide of Federal defeat was checked at the very summit 
of the ridge. 

Slow and recalcitrant as he was, Longstreet's battle of the second 
dav, was in itself a great success. Late as it was, he accomplished 
Lee's purpose and rolled back the Federal left towards Gettysburg, 
overwhelming Sickles with his tremendous attack. But if he had 
heeded Hood and Law, he would also have taken Eound Top, and 
probably have occupied the Tarrytown road, in rear of Meade's 
army. And the opportunity of the second day was lost to the Con- 
federates. 

General Lee's left had not been idle. Edward Johnson and his 
division had fought bravely and persistently for Gulp's hill, and 
entered the first line of the Federal entrenchments. Early sent two 
brigades gallantly against the cemetery, under withering fire, and, 
breaking the line of the Eleventh corps, entered the Federal works 
on the summit. At three points that late afternoon the wave of 
Confederate attack crossed the stone walls and entered the de- 
fences — Wright's Georgians from the right center, Hay's and 
Hoke's, under Colonel Avery, from the center at the cemetery, 
l)ringing back some captured flags, and the Stonewall Brigade of 
Virginians from the left on Culp's hill. But in each case the 
spirited attacks were not supported, and the battle on the Confed- 
erate side was in detail and disconnected. Wright was not sup- 
ported by brigades of Hill's command, that strangely, were not sent 
into battle. Early was not supported by Rodes, who, perhaps the 
finest division commander in Lee's army, was not ready, and Ed- 
ward Johnson, on the left^ found it impossible to move his whole 
command through and over the natural obstructions of Culp's 
hill in the face of the enemy. 

'J'lie (lay was over, the day on which thousands on both sides gave 
their lives, willing sacrifices, for their convictions of right. It 
wrote in blood a victory for Longstreet's corps, and yet a defeat for 
General Lee. The extreme right, under General Law, held the 
Devil's Den. and at least the bases of the Round Tops. While the 



19 

extreme left, under Johnson, held the crest of Gulp's hill, almost 
in reach of the Baltimore road. 

That night the Confederate forces were far from being a de- 
feated army. They were in great .spirits, and had the fervor of 
battle in high degree. Pickett, with three brigades, had arrived 
from the rear. Stuart, with his cavalry, had come up on the left, 
and the artillery was Avell up and in place. In the official report, 
General Lee says : "The result of this day's operations induced 
the belief that, with proper concert of action and with the increased 
support that the positions gained on the right, would enable the ar- 
tillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately suc- 
ceed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack." 
The general plan was unchanged. 

General Meade's council that night with his twelve generals was 
one of perplexity, and divided opinions. One of them says : "It was 
a gloomy hour." Twenty thousand men was the reported loss. But 
it was, at last, decided to remain one day and await Lee's as- 
sault. And during the night dispatches from Kichmond to General 
Lee, which had been captured, were brought in. They relieved 
Meade's anxieties about Washington, and encouraged him to hold 
his ground. 

THE THIRD DAY 

At daylight it was found that the Eound Tops were heavily oc- 
cupied. Meade had reinforced his left with the Fifth and Sixth 
corps and heavy artillery. General Lee, changing his plan, directed 
Longstreet to form a column of attack on the Federal left centre, 
and assault from the south, while Ewell attacked from the north, 
at Gulp's hill, on the opposite sides of the fish hook curve. 
Picket's division, not yet in battle, was to be the centre, with 
Heth's division of Hill's corps, under Pettigrew, us a second line. 
Two brigades (Wilcox and Perry) of Anderson's division, supported 
the right, and two brigades (Lane and Scales), under Trimble, 
supported the left. Ewell's left had begun vigorously on Gulp's 
hill, when the order to advance was given to Pickett. Near the 
middle of Hancock's line was a clump of trees, which General L^tJ 
suggested to Longstreet as an objective point. It was not far 
from the position Wright's Georgians had gained the evening before. 
At 10 A. M., General E. P. Alexander opened the fire of fifteen guns 



20 

along the Emmcttslnirg road, and General R. L. Walker opened 
from the Seminary hill a hattery of sixty-three guns. The ar- 
tillery was to go forward as the infantry column advanced and 
support the attacks. 

Again Longstreet AA^as reluctant. Three liours passed away in 
unnecessary delay. And in this time Ewell's attack on Gulp's hill 
was a wasted opportunity. Not until 2 o'clock did the artillery 
duel hegin. More than two hundred guns made a crash and roar 
that was indescrihable and unearthly. The two ridges opposing 
were blazing volcanoes. The Gonfederate fire swept the Gemetery 
ridge. General Walker, of the Federal army, says : "The v/hole 
space behind Gemetery hill was in a moment rendered uninhabit- 
able. Gaissons exploded, destruction covered the whole ground, 
army headquarters were broken up. Xever had a storm so dread- 
ful burst on mortal man."' The batteries in the Gemetery with- 
drew, partly to save ammunition. General Alexander, with the ad- 
vanced guns, wrote a line to Picket: "If you are coming at all, 
you must come at once." Pickett asked Longstreet, "Shall I ad- 
vance?" and he was silent. Then Pickett said: "Sir, I shall lead 
my division forward !" And they went. Out of the woods, across 
the Emmettsburg road, two lines of gray, with glittering bayo- 
nets, 12,000 of them altogether, with their supports. A deep silence 
fell upon the field. Half-way to Hancock's salient and the' clump 
of trees, they met the canister and the musket fire in their faces. 
But the Gonfederate batteries had nearly exhausted their ammu- 
nition, and were unable to help the charging column in its hour of 
sore need. General Lee says in his report: "Owing to the fact, 
which was iwrknown to ]ne when the assault took place, the enemy 
v.as enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, 
already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery." Alexander, 
Longstreet's chief of artillery, had a reserve of nine howitzers, in- 
tending to take them with Pickett across the field. But when 
they were wanted they had been removed, and could not be found. 
Fifteen guns were taken out for the advance, but in the crisis, it 
was found that their chests had not been refilled. Federal artil- 
lery wore away the left of the attacking force, and a Vermont 
brigade charged upon its right. The guns on Round Top enfiladed 
the line. When Pickett's men reached one hundred yards from 
the wall, the Federal line broke to the rear. The left of Pickett's 



21 

division and the right of Pettigrew's and Trimble's line reached 
the stone wall, silenced the guns and captured prisoners. Arm- 
stead's brigade, which was Pickett's second line, also reached the 
wall. And for a little while there seemed no enemy before them. 
In Meade's center a long space was held by men in gray, and the 
stars and bars waved over the stone wall. Above the stone wall 
was the crest of the ridge, and Armistead, with his hat on the 
point of his sword, sprang forv/ard, crying, "Boys, we must give 
them the cold steel; who will follow me?" A line of Virginians 
leaped forward and reached the crest, when Armistead fell, and his 
line fell back to the wall. Some one without authority ordered a 
retreat, and many turned to flee. From the flanks, forces of Fed- 
eral troops swarmed in upon them, and 4,000 men were cut off from 
the retreat, and were prisoners. Other brigades were sent for- 
ward, but too late, and only to be driven back. Two divisions in 
reserve, Anderson on the left and McLaws on the right, received 
no orders from Longstreet to advance. 

Colonel Freemantle, of the English arni}^, writes : "General Lee 
was perfectly sublime." Calm and quiet, he and his staff were earn- 
estly engaged in rallying the returning men, encouraging them 
with many kind words. General Wilcox came to him much dis- 
tressed, but General Lee said to him : "Xever mind. General, all 
this has been my fault. It is I that have lost this fight, and you 
must help me out of it the best you can.'* During the immensely 
critical action of the afternoon, a cavalry charge under General 
Farnsworth against the Confederate right had been repulsed, i^nd 
Stuart, with the Confederate cavalry, had attempted to get around 
the Federal right beyond Gulp's Hill and reach the Baltimore Turn- 
pike, but was repulsed by General Gregg. 

Would General Meade advance in force? Lee's artillery was put 
in battery on Seminary Eidge, and the depleted ranks of the di- 
visions were promptly drawn into line. But both had suffered enor- 
mously, and neither was capable of attack. The Confederate loss 
in the three days was something more than 20,000, one-third of a 
total of 63,000 of all arms. Dead on the field were Armistead, 
Garnett, Pender, Barksdale, and Semmes. Seriously wounded were 
Wade, Hampton, Hood, Kemper, Heth, Pettigrew, Trimble, Scales, 
Jenkins, and S. T. Anderson, while Archer was a prisoner. In an 
unusual percentage young regimental and company officers, the 



22 

flower of all the Southland, were lef^ upon the field. Of many of 
them and a multitude of men in the ranks, the pride and hope of 
the best of homes, no tidings came back. In unkno^^oi graves thej 
sleep, many of them in Hollywood, willing sacrifices, offered ift 
their country and their God. 

THE DAY AFTER. 

One whole day — it was Saturday, the 4th of July — both 
armies rested, as if the memories of a common American liberty 
and achievement forbade the disturbance of the day sacred to all. 
On the night of the 4th, the trains began to retire, by Cash- 
town and by Fairfield, through the gaps of the South Mountains. 
Tjong lines of ambulances wended their painful way in the darkness, 
over rocky roads, through the cold and damp of mountain passes. 
The artillery followed, and then the divisions which had left so 
many behind. Ewell's corps, as a rear guard, did not leave Gettys- 
burg until the forenoon of July 5th. The sun was shining brightly 
when I rode with General Ewell out of the town square, and by the 
Seminary, which was filled with our wounded officers and men. 

In an address to his command at Hagerstown, July 11th, General 
Lee said : "After long and trying marches, endured with fortitude 
that has ever characterized the soldiers of the army of Northern 
Virginia, you have penetrated the country of our enemies, and 
recalled to the defence of their own soil those who were engaged in 
the invasion of ours. You have fought a fierce and sanguinary 
battle, which, if not attended with the success that hitherto crowned 
our efforts, was marked with the same heroic spirit that has, com- 
manded the respect of your enemies, the gratitude of your country, 
and the admiration of mankind." 

It was not until the night of July 13th that General Lee and 
his army recrossed the Potomac, and were once more at home in 
Virginia. 

W^AS IT A DRAWN BATTLE ? 

Was it in any sense a drawn battle? One day and two nights 
General Meade made no counter attack. In the retirement of the 
Confederate army there was no rear guard action. It was ten 
days after the close of the battle before Lee crossed the Potomac 
river, and he was not attacked by Meade. He carried nearly 5,000 



23 

prisoners away, and there was no attempt to recover them. He 
carried his artillery back and his long wagon trains almost without 
interruption and without serious loss. On Virginia soil his troops 
were an organized army, with splendid morale, and ready for 
battle at any hour. Whatever of defeat the army of Northern. 
Virginia met at Gett}'sburg, it was neither destroyed nor yet over- 
thrown, nor was it broken in spirit. 

The battle was fought by the Confederate army for the first 
time in the enemy's country, with communications cut, with lim- 
ited supplies, and, as soon as the action was joined, compelled ^o 
keep closely inside the narrow lines. 

As to numbers, Colonel Livermore (p. 102) estimates the Union 
army, as total engaged, 88,289, and the Confederate army, as effec- 
tives, 75,000, a disparity of over 13,000 in favor of the army of 
General Meade. But on June 27th, General Hooker, urging a re- 
quest for reinforcements, writes to General Halleck that his whole 
force of enlisted men present for duty would not exceed 105,000. 
General Meade testified that, on taking command, the returns 
called for 105,000, and that he had "upon that battlefield" a little 
under 105,000 men. General Humphreys confirmed these figures 
by his estimate of 99,475, to which were to be added troops that 
arrived and actually went into battle, making, say 103,000. Colonel 
Walter Taylor, Lee's Adjutant-General, has estimated Lee's effective 
force on the field at 67,000, making a disparity of 36,000. In 
round numbers, Meade's army was one-fourth more than Lee's. 

The loss of StoneAvall Jackson, a month before Gettysburg, was 
a bereavement that was felt deeply by the whole army, by its com- 
manding general and throughout the command. When Jackson 
(ell, Lee, as he himself said, lost his right arm. The void which 
had been made was too great to be so soon closed ; the wound which 
the army received, too deep to be healed in four weeks. Lee him- 
self felt his great loss. He felt uneasy and without confidence, as 
many of his generals remarked. After the war, at Lexington, to 
Professor White, of the L^niversity, General Lee said: "If I had 
had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, we should have won a great 
victory." The absence of Jackson accounted for the failure to take 
the Cemetery the first day, as it certainly accounted for the want 
of concert and confidence throughout the whole action. The com- 



24 

pelling will was not there to move an army corps as an unit, with, 
his own imparted strength, in one vigorous and persistent attack. 

The ahsence of General Stuart and the cavalry was seriously 
felt hy General Lee. He could neither ascertain the location and 
numhers of the various forces of his enemy, nor could he cover the 
movements of his own separated divisions. General Stuart used 
the discretion given, and believed he was doing a valuable thing 
by cutting the communication with Washington, but that was oO 
temporary that it had no great value, and the movement seriously 
cri]ip]ed his own army. It resulted in bringing on an engagement 
prematurely, and under conditions that gave General Lee the offen- 
sive, and the offensive in as difficult a place as could be found 
])erhaps in all eastern Pennsylvania. 

Yet the most serious obstacle which Lee had to overcome was the 
unwillingness of General Longstreet to obey the wishes of his com- 
manding General. He had views of his own about the campaign, 
and l)ecause General Lee did not accept them, he resisted the will 
of his commander from tb.c beginning to the end. With the head of 
his column a few miles from the field on the evening of the first 
day, and knowing well the necessity and General Lee"s expressed 
wish,, his troops were not brought up until well in the second day, 
and were not in action until 4 o'clock. On the third day he moved 
with the same reluctance and dilatoriness, and failed to support 
the attack made by Pickett's column, when he had two divisions 
of his own in hand. There is no great commander in history, 
except Robert E. Lee, who would not have found on the spot a 
solution for the behavior of General Longstreet. "]^othing that 
occurred at Gettysburg,"" says General Gordon, "nor anything that 
has been written since of that battle, has lessened the conviction 
that, had General Lee's orders been promptly and cordially exo- 
ciited, Meade's center on the third day would have been penetrated 
and the Union army overwdielmingly defeated."" (Gordon"s Remi- 
niscences of the Civil War, p. 160.) 

Was the invasion of I'cniisylvaiiia a great mistake? So thought 
the Count de Paris in his able review of the campaign. But Gen- 
eral Lee never thought it a mistake. In 1864, the next year, he 
said to (Jencral llcth: "If 1 could do so — unfortunately, I cannot — 
I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I be- 
lieve it to be the true ])olicy, notwithstanding the failure of last 



year." For the Confederacy, Gettysburg deferred for one year at 
least the advance on the Confederate Capital, and by so much pro- 
longed the hope of independence. 

A GREAT SOLDIER. 

Was General Robert E. Lee really a great soldier and a great 
commander ? 

One might call the roll of the distinguished Federal commanders 
who, with large advantage of numbers, equipment, resources, credit, 
and backed by great States, populous and rich, came out to try con- 
clusions with him. They were George B. McClelland, John Pope, 
Ambrose Burnside, Joseph Hooker, George Meade, and Ulysses 
Grant, before whose almost unlimited numbers, at last, the Army 
of I^orthern Virginia, without reinforcement, without ammunition 
and without supplies, fought itself down to nothing. 

Another answer might be the battles he fought on the Chicka- 
hominy, and in the defence of .Richmond ; of the Second Manassas, 
of Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the 
Wilderness, and again on the Chickahominy, and the defence of 
Petersburg. Across these fields are written imperishably the gen- 
eralship of Lee — in all the detail of preparation, in the skilful 
choice of topographical lines, in strategic movement, in the aduda- 
city of perilous advance, in knowledge of the capacity of his own offi- 
cers and their troops, in fine perception of the enemy's thought arid 
movement, and in masterly overcoming difficulties that came from 
inadequate supplies of ordnance, ammunition and army stores of 
every kind. 

Yet another answer would be the four years of continuous and 
wasting struggle, by a blockaded country, without manufactures, 
without munitions of war, almost without a navy, without well de- 
veloped transportation lines, without credit abroad, with supplies 
given by a willing people fast disappearing, with fields left untilled 
and unproductive because the young men were under arms on 
the battle lines, and with sections constantly widening in devas- 
tation and depopulation. And yet General Lee for three years 
led a patriotic army against superior numbers across victorious 
fields, and sent a line of notable commanders, defeated, home. 
Moreover, the historian of the future will discern that "The fall 
of Richmond and the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia 



26 

were consequence of events in the west and southwest, and not 
directly of the operations in A'irginia." (Early.) 

Was he indeed a great commander? In 1861, General Winfield 
Scott said : "If given an opportmiity, Lee will prove himself the 
greatest captain of history." To General Wm. C. Preston, General 
Scott said : "I tell you, that if I were on my death's bed to-morrow, 
and the President of the United States should tell me that a great 
battle was to be fought for the liberty or slavery of the country, and 
asked my judgment as to the ability of a commander, I would say 
with my dying breath. 'Let it be Robert E. Lee !' " 

During the war, Stonewall Jackson said : "General I^ee is a phe- 
nomenon. He is the only man I would be willing to follow blind- 
folded." 

After the war. Lord Wolsey said : "I have met many of the great 
men of my time, but Lee alone impressed me with the feeling that 
I was in the presence of a man who was cast in grander mould and 
made of different and finer metal than all other men." 

President Andrews, of Brown University, said : "I fail to find in 
the books any such anasterful generalship as this hero showed, hold- 
ing that slim, gray line, half starved, with no prospects of addi- 
tions, and fighting when his army was too hungry to stand, and the 
rifles were only useful as clubs. His courage was sublime. He 
was as great as Gustavus Adolphus, or Napoleon, or Wellington, or 
Yon Moltke." 

Was he a great commander? In the esteem of the array he led, 
he was — in victory, in defeat, and in surrender, there was a confi- 
dence and devotion that grew and deepened to the end of the strug- 
gle, a universal faith in his capacity, his energy, his untiring loyalty 
and zeal. In the esteem of the people of the South, the ability of 
Lee to lead their army in Virginia was unquestioned then, and re- 
mains unquestioned to tliis day. 

A GREAT MAX. 

Leaving the question of Ids military capacity, was Robert E. Lee 
a great man? In the Arlington mansion there is on the first floor, 
a small room, to the left of the hall, Mdiich was his office and 
library. One day in the spring of the year 1861 he paced the 
floor, and alone fought out the hattU' in his lireast of a great de- 
cision. In tlu' cNciiinu. with a clear conscience, and looking vo 



27 

God for his blessino;, he lay down his commission and the offer of 
the supreme comanand of the United States armj^; he laid down 
the flag he had followed, and to which he had given the prime of 
his manhood; he gave np the hope of peace between the States of 
the Republic for which he had longed and prayed ; he surrendered 
the ancestral home and its traditions, his property and the happi- 
ness of his family. And he took up instead the rights of his State 
under the Constitution, and the honor and hopes of a people with- 
out an army, at the beginning of a struggle over which hung a thick 
veil. No small nmn ever made such a decision. 

Is magnanimity an element of greatness ? After Chancellorsville 
he wrote to Stonewall Jackson : "I congratulate you on the victory, 
which is due to your skill and energy." At the close of the battle 
of Gettysburg, he said : "All this has been my fault. It is I that 
have lost this iight." After his return to Virginia, he urged upon 
President Davis the acceptance of his resignation. Of the army 
he said: "It would be the liappiest day of my life to see at its 
head a worthy- leader, one tliat would accomplish more than I can 
perform and all that I have wished. I hope your excellency will 
attribute my request to the true reason — the desire to serve my 
country and to do all in my poM'er to insure the success of her 
righteous cause." 

At x\ppomattox, returning from the negotiations of surrender, 
his men gathered around him, veterans of many fields, grim and 
ragged, weeping as with broken hearts, and blessing him as they 
wejjt. To them, with tones trembling with deep emotion, he said : 
^'Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the 
best I could for you. ^ly heart is too full to say more !" 

Are the love of peace and order marks of greatness? After the 
surrender of the worn remnant of his army, not for a moment would 
be consent to the schemes of fierce and foolish men for the continu- 
ance of the struggle and a guerrilla warfare in the mountains. He 
counseled return to home and peaceable pursuits, and unquestion- 
ing obedience to law, and himself promptly set the example. 

He spoke of a small farm to earn his daily bread, for retire- 
ment and simplicity and family happiness. He declined every 
proposition of emolument and publicity in this country and abroad. 
Under abuse and threatening, he was patient and silent. To a 
small college in the Virginia Valley he went to a position, not con- 



28 

spiciious, not lucrative, and which involved labor and anxiety, and 
there gave himself to the education of the youth of the South, as 
the truest and largest hope of the recovery of the people froin 
the waste and calamity of war. 

General Lee was distinctly a great college executive. In the 
prime of his manhood, he was the successful superintendent of West 
Point, and the last six years of his life were spent as president of 
Washington College. He impressed his great personality upon the 
entire college community, and established its high ideals of chai'- 
acter and manhood. He gave attention to every detail of college 
activity, no matter how minute. His annual report^ to the college 
trustees are models of conciseness, and show the hand of a master. 
He gave his energies to constructive work, anticipating Southern 
thought as to the necessity of scientific and practical education. Hi 
was a prophet of the modern theory that the college library should 
be the chief college "laboratory." He commended and strength- 
ened the honor system in Virginia colleges. For himself, he had 
a superb literary style, and his great interest in the college library 
marked him as a man of distinct literary tastes and aptitude. When 
he undertook to inform himself, he would exhaust the subject, by 
reading the great authorities consulted, by personal investigation 
of living sources, and by profound reflection. One day some com- 
petent person will bring to the knowledge of all the spirit and work 
of Eobert E. Lee as an educator of youth. And over it all will he 
shown his intense love and admiration for youth, and his own per- 
sonal devotion to the profession which in such large degree holds 
the future in its grasp. 

You will permit me to say that, in the midst of all our modern 
materialism and naturalism, and the various theories of what pro- 
duces a noble manhood, that I still believe that religion is the one 
solid and sure basis of character, pure and peaceful, and the supreme 
guide into all lofty career — unselfish, generous, fruit-bearing for 
the hungry multitudes. In the religion of Robert E. Lee there was 
faith without fanaticism, prayer without pretension, a reality, a 
genileness and simplicity that kept him brave in peril and tran- 
quil in disaster. He feared God, and was strong. "He loved God 
and little children." In a life of simple Christian faith, of high 
and noble purposes, of unweary discharge of duty, he who had not 
Avon the independence of the Confederacy of the South, taught all 



29 

his coiintiymen lessons that will not be obliterated, but will help to 
establish the American people in that righteousness which exalteth 
a nation, which is the strength and honor of any people, and gavo 
them a monumental light that will never go out. The Confed- 
eracy of the South long ago furled its banner, and the people ac- 
cepted the arbitrament of war. Whatever else it gave to the com- 
mon country, not the least will be the memory of the young sol- 
diers who, with valor and devotion, freely gave their lives at the 
stone walls on the heights of Gettysburg. And not the least splen- 
did contribution to American history is the character of their 
great captain, Robert E. Lee. 

No seed is lost that makes a fruitful Nature 
Bring from her breast a grand, majestic tree : 

Nor can a cause be wholly unavailing 

That yields the world a perfect flower like Lee. 



